Using artefactual field and lab experiments to investigate how fee-for-service and capitation affect medical service provision
HERO WP 2014/03: Authors: Jeannette Brosig-Koch, University of Duisburg-Essen and Health Economics Research Center, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, University of Bonn and University of Oslo, Nadja Kairies-Schwarz, University of Duisburg-Essen and Health Economics Research Center and Daniel Wiesen, University of Cologne and University of Oslo.
We analyze how physicians, medical students, and non-medical students respond to financial incentives from fee-for-service and capitation. We employ a series of artefactual field and conventional lab experiments framed in a physician decision-making context. Physicians, participating in the eld, and medical and non-medical students, participating in lab experiments, respond to the incentives in a consistent way: Significantly more medical services are provided under fee-for-service compared to capitation. Our findings are robust regarding subjects' gender, age, and personality traits.