Does performance disclosure influence physicians’ medical decisions? An experimental study*

HERO WP 2015/5: Authors: Geir Godager, University of Oslo, Heike Hennig-Schmidt University of Bonn and University of Oslo, Tor Iversen, University of Oslo.

Abstract

Quality improvements in markets for medical care are key objectives in any Health reform. An important question is whether disclosing physicians’ performance can contribute to achieving these goals. Due to the asymmetric information inherent in medical markets, one may argue that changes in the information structure are likely to influence the environment in which health care providers operate. In a Laboratory experiment with medical students that mimics a physician decision-making environment we analyze the effect of disclosing performance information to peers. Our results suggest that the information structure does influence the individual physician’s supply of medical services. Under performance disclosure, choices that are in accordance with the medical norm or maximize the joint benefit become more frequent.

ISBN 978-82-7756-249-0

Publisert 9. nov. 2015 13:37 - Sist endret 9. nov. 2015 13:43