Oddvar Martin Kaarbøe
The theoretical framework that underlies my work is principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theory has taught us that special concerns arise when performance pay is to be used in complex organizations. One avenue I will continue to explore is how economic incentives can be used to reward (treatment) quality. My motivation to do this research is related to the fact that more and more health care payers are using economic incentives to obtain better quality even though it is very hard to verify which quality levels are delivered.
My empirical works have focused how reforms and incentive schemes are implemented in the health care sector and its organizations. One main area of my research is related to health care reforms that mainly affects prioritization of patients and waiting times.
I got my PhD in economics at the University of Bergen in 2000 (Game theory). After finishing my PhD I started working for Health Economics Bergen (HEB), and in 2010 as professor at the University of Bergen. In 2008 I became the research director of HEB.