Live, online Lecture: Wednesday, November 5th, 2025, 19.00 CET (Europe/Oslo); 1.00 PM EST
Abstract:
Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufficient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view does not take sufficiently seriously the possibility that sub-computational biological mechanisms which realize computational processes are necessary for consciousness. Using the contrast between computational roles and their sub-computational biological realizers, I show that our criteria for consciousness in AI and animals may lead to opposing conclusions and in that sense AI and animals are competitors. Current theories of consciousness are “meat-neutral,” but if meat is necessary, AI may never be conscious. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both is crucial for assessing the prospects of conscious AI and in simple animals.
Ned Block in an eminent philosopher of mind who has made important contributions to the philosophy of consciousness and cognitive science. He has been professor of philosophy and psychology at New York University since 1996 and a Silver Professor since 2005. Block has mounted the overflow argument, which argues that phenomenal consciousness overflows conscious access, implying that one can consciously experience something that one lacks conscious access to. Block is also noted for presenting the Blockhead argument against the Turing test as a test of intelligence, and is also known for his criticism of functionalism, arguing that a system with the same functional states as a human is not necessarily conscious.
Read more about this event, and other news on our website Forum for Consciousness Research.