Ge Ge

• Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir & Wang, Jian (2022). Exploring physician agency under demand-side cost sharing—An experimental approach. Health Economics. ISSN 1057-9230. 31(6), p. 1202–1227. doi: 10.1002/hec.4489. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The assumption of patient-regarding physicians has been widely adopted in the health economics literature. Physicians' patient-regarding preferences are often described as the concern for the health benefits of medical treatments, and thus closely related to the norms and ethics of the Medical profession. In this paper, we ask whether physicians' patient-regarding preferences include a concern for their patient's consumption opportunities alongside patient's health benefits. To identify and quantify patient-regarding preferences, we design and conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment where choices determine separately the health benefit and the consumption opportunities of a real patient admitted to the nearest hospital. We find strong evidence that future physicians care about their patients' consumption opportunities.

• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2021). Data from an incentivized laboratory experiment on strategic medical choices. Data in Brief. ISSN 2352-3409. 35. doi: 10.1016/j.dib.2021.106926.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2021). Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model. Journal of Choice Modelling. ISSN 1755-5345. 39, p. 1–14. doi: 10.1016/j.jocm.2021.100282. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Quantal response equilibrium choice (QREC) models are structural behavioral models that account for bounded rationality and strategic interactions in analyses of games where each player’s payoff is a vector. We revisit the question of how market competition affects pro-social behavior and fit a QREC model to data from an incentivized laboratory experiment, where the participants make decisions on medical treatment for abstract patients in monopoly, duopoly and quadropoly games. Our results demonstrate that competition can cause substantial behavioral responses without any changes in pro-social preferences if one allows for the possibility that competition influences the degree of randomness in decision-making. We find that a QREC model with fixed preference parameters provides precise out-of-sample predictions of behavior in games with vector payoffs. A Monte Carlo study is performed to show that the two-step estimator is accurate.

• Cheo, Roland; Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Liu, Rugang; Wang, Jian & Wang, Qiqi (2020). The effect of a mystery shopper scheme on prescribing behavior in primary care: Results from a field experiment. Health Economics Review. ISSN 2191-1991. 10(33). doi: 10.1186/s13561-020-00290-z. Full text in Research Archive

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• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2022). Imperfect quality competition in regulated health care markets. Show summary

  We study equilibrium quality in a health care market with regulated prices. Demand-side behavior is derived from choice axioms, and the demand-side responds imperfectly to differences in provider quality. The quality-responsiveness of the demand-side, medical technology and cost structure determines a unique payoff matrix for providers. Payoffs to providers are vectors with two elements: profit and patient benefit. For alternative degrees of quality-responsiveness, we derive the set of pure strategies that constitute feasible Pareto equilibria or Bayesian Nash equilibria in a duopoly market. The minimal quality that can be implemented as a Pareto equilibrium or Bayesian Nash equilibrium rises if the demand-side becomes more responsive to quality. Exploiting data from an incentivized laboratory experiment on strategic medical choices, we find that for 36 % of cases, decision-makers choose medical treatments that are dominated by other treatment strategies. We compute the quantal response equilibria for alternative levels of quality-responsiveness and show that equilibrium qualities are positively related to the quality-responsiveness of the demand-side. The consequences for the market equilibrium of a more quality responsive demand-side are qualitatively similar in a quantal response equilibrium and in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our results illustrate how and why choice opportunities for patients cause quality incentives for providers, even in markets where the demand side has an imperfect quality response. An important policy implication is that policies that succeed in raising the quality-responsiveness of the demand-side will lead to a rise in equilibrium qualities provided to the market. Classic examples include lowering transaction costs and transportation costs.

• Ge, Ge (2021). Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2019). A Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice Model.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2019). A Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice Model.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2019). A Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice Model.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2018). Markets and Rationality.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2018). Markets and rationality.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2018). Markets and rationality .
• Cheo, Roland; Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Wang, Jian; Wang, Qiqi & Liu, Rugang (2017). The effect of a mystery shopper program on prescriptions in primary care: Results from a field experiment.
• Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Wang, Jian & Wiesen, Daniel (2017). Pysicians' preferences under demand-side cost sharing.
• Godager, Geir; Cheo, Roland; Ge, Ge; Liu, Rugang; Wang, Qiqi & Wang, Jian (2016). The Effect of a Mystery Shopper Program on Prescription in Primary Care: Results from a Field Experiment in China.
• Ge, Ge; Cheo, Roland; Godager, Geir; Liu, Rugang; Wang, Qiqi & Wang, Jian (2016). Gender Differences in Antibiotic Prescriptions of Primary Health Providers in China.
• Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin; Lindén, Tord Skogedal; Ervik, Rune; Holmås, Tor Helge; Iversen, Tor & Holter, Marianne Therese Smogeli [Show all 7 contributors for this article] (2021). Evaluering av fritt behandlingsvalg. Universitetet i Oslo.
• Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir (2021). Essays in experimental health economics. University of Oslo. Full text in Research Archive
• Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir & Wang, Jian (2019). Do physicians care about patients’ utility? Evidence from an experimental study of treatment choices under demand-side cost sharing. Universitetet i Oslo. ISSN 978-82-7756-266-7. 2019(2).
• Cheo, Roland; Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Liu, Rugang; Wang, Qiqi & Wang, Jian (2018). The effect of a mystery shopper scheme on prescriptions in primary care. universitetet i oslo. ISSN 978‐82‐7756‐262‐9. 2018(1).

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