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Ge, Ge; Iversen, Tor; Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin & Snilsberg, Øyvind
(2022).
The impacts of Norway’s extended free choice reform.
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Ge, Ge; Iversen, Tor; Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin & Snilsberg, Øyvind
(2022).
The impacts of Norway’s extended free choice reform.
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Ge, Ge; Iversen, Tor; Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin & Snilsberg, Øyvind
(2022).
The impacts of Norway’s extended free choice reform.
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Ge, Ge; Iversen, Tor; Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin & Snilsberg, Øyvind
(2022).
The impacts of Norway’s extended free choice reform.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2022).
Imperfect quality competition in regulated health care markets
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2022).
Imperfect quality competition in regulated health care markets.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2022).
Imperfect quality competition in regulated health care markets.
Show summary
We study equilibrium quality in a health care market with regulated prices. Demand-side behavior is derived from choice axioms, and the demand-side responds imperfectly to differences in provider quality. The quality-responsiveness of the demand-side, medical technology and cost structure determines a unique payoff matrix for providers. Payoffs to providers are vectors with two elements: profit and patient benefit. For alternative degrees of quality-responsiveness, we derive the set of pure strategies that constitute feasible Pareto equilibria or Bayesian Nash equilibria in a duopoly market. The minimal quality that can be implemented as a Pareto equilibrium or Bayesian Nash equilibrium rises if the demand-side becomes more responsive to quality.
Exploiting data from an incentivized laboratory experiment on strategic medical choices, we find that for 36 % of cases, decision-makers choose medical treatments that are dominated by other treatment strategies. We compute the quantal response equilibria for alternative levels of quality-responsiveness and show that equilibrium qualities are positively related to the quality-responsiveness of the demand-side. The consequences for the market equilibrium of a more quality responsive demand-side are qualitatively similar in a quantal response equilibrium and in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Our results illustrate how and why choice opportunities for patients cause quality incentives for providers, even in markets where the demand side has an imperfect quality response. An important policy implication is that policies that succeed in raising the quality-responsiveness of the demand-side will lead to a rise in equilibrium qualities provided to the market. Classic examples include lowering transaction costs and transportation costs.
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Ge, Ge; Iversen, Tor; Kaarbøe, Oddvar Martin & Snilsberg, Øyvind
(2021).
The impacts of Norway’s extended free choice reform.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2021).
Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model.
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Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Thomas, Stephanie & Hole, Arne Risa
(2021).
A protocol for a choice experiment and data analysis.
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Ge, Ge
(2021).
Essays in experimental health economics.
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Ge, Ge
(2021).
Predicting strategic medical choices: An application of a quantal response equilibrium choice model.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2019).
A Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice Model.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2019).
A Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice Model.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2019).
A Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice Model.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2018).
Markets and Rationality.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2018).
Markets and rationality.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2018).
Markets and rationality
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Cheo, Roland; Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Wang, Jian; Wang, Qiqi & Liu, Rugang
(2017).
The effect of a mystery shopper program on prescriptions in primary care: Results from a field experiment.
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Ge, Ge; Godager, Geir; Wang, Jian & Wiesen, Daniel
(2017).
Pysicians' preferences under demand-side cost sharing.
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Godager, Geir; Cheo, Roland; Ge, Ge; Liu, Rugang; Wang, Qiqi & Wang, Jian
(2016).
The Effect of a Mystery Shopper Program on Prescription in Primary Care: Results from a Field Experiment in China.
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Ge, Ge; Cheo, Roland; Godager, Geir; Liu, Rugang; Wang, Qiqi & Wang, Jian
(2016).
Gender Differences in Antibiotic Prescriptions of Primary Health Providers in China.
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Ge, Ge & Godager, Geir
(2021).
Essays in experimental health economics.
Universitetet i Oslo.
Full text in Research Archive
Show summary
In order to implement effective health policy reforms, knowledge of physician preferences, and hence, their responses to policy reforms is desirable. This thesis consists of three papers aiming to address fundamental research questions on physician behavior. Paper I investigates whether the change of information scheme affects physicians’ prescribing behavior. The results suggest that preannouncing a mystery shopper audit reduces physicians’ probability of prescribing drugs to the pseudopatients. Paper II explores physicians’ response to cost-sharing borne by the patients and finds that future physicians are concerned about the influences of their medical treatment choices on patients’ consumption opportunities after co-payment. Paper III introduces a strategic decision scenario and studies physician treatment decisions under competition. The results indicate that the substantial difference in behavior between markets may be attributed to changes in individuals’ scale parameter. The scale parameter rises as markets become more competitive, implying a higher degree of determinism in behavior. The data of all three papers are collected from experiments. Under the framework of stochastic choice theory, three special cases of a generalized multinomial logit model are employed in the data analysis.
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