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Background: Developing and testing methods for reliably measuring the state of consciousness of individuals is important for both basic research and clinical purposes. In recent years, several promising measures of consciousness, grounded in theoretical developments, have been proposed. However, the degrees to which these measures are affected by changes in brain activity that are not related to changes in the degree of consciousness has not been well tested. In this study, we examined whether several of these measures are modulated by the loading of cognitive resources. Methods: We recorded electroencephalography (EEG) from 12 participants in two conditions: (1) while passively attending to sensory stimuli related to the measures and (2) during increased cognitive load consisting of a demanding working memory task. We investigated whether a set of proposed objective EEG-based measures of consciousness differed between the passive and the cognitively demanding conditions. Results: The P300b event-related potential (sensitive to conscious awareness of deviance from an expected pattern in auditory stimuli) was significantly affected by concurrent performance on a working memory task, whereas various measures based on signal diversity of spontaneous and perturbed EEG were not. Conclusion: Because signal diversity-based measures of spontaneous or perturbed EEG are not sensitive to the degree of cognitive load, we suggest that these measures may be used in clinical situations where attention, sensory processing, or command following might be impaired.
In a recent electroencephalography (EEG) sleep study inspired by complexity theories of consciousness, we found that multi-channel signal diversity progressively decreased from wakefulness to slow wave sleep, but failed to find any significant difference between dreaming and non-dreaming awakenings within the same sleep stage (NREM2). However, we did find that multi-channel Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) measured over the posterior cortex increased with more perceptual ratings of NREM2 dream experience along a thought-perceptual axis. In this follow-up study, we re-tested our previous findings, using a slightly different approach. Partial sleep-deprivation was followed by evening sleep experiments, with repeated awakenings and immediate dream reports. Participants reported whether they had been dreaming, and were asked to rate how diverse, vivid, perceptual, and thought-like the contents of their dreams were. High density (64 channel) EEG was recorded throughout the experiment, and mean single-channel LZC was calculated for each 30 s sleep epoch. LZC progressively decreased with depth of non-REM sleep. Surprisingly, estimated marginal mean LZC was slightly higher for NREM1 than for wakefulness, but the difference did not remain significant after adjusting for multiple comparisons. We found no significant difference in LZC between dream and non-dream awakenings, nor any significant relationship between LZC and subjective ratings of dream experience, within the same sleep stage (NREM2). The failure to reproduce our own previous finding of a positive correlation between posterior LZC and more perceptual dream experiences, or to find any other correlation between brain signal complexity and subjective experience within NREM2 sleep, raises the question of whether EEG LZC is really a reliable correlate of richness of experience as such, within the same sleep stage.
It remains unclear how specific cortical regions contribute to the brain’s overall capacity for consciousness. Clarifying this could help distinguish between theories of consciousness. Here, we investigate the association between markers of regionally specific (de)activation and the brain’s overall capacity for consciousness. We recorded electroencephalographic responses to cortical electrical stimulation in six rats and computed Perturbational Complexity Index state-transition (PCIST), which has been extensively validated as an index of the capacity for consciousness in humans. We also estimated the balance between activation and inhibition of specific cortical areas with the ratio between high and low frequency power from spontaneous electroencephalographic activity at each electrode. We repeated these measurements during wakefulness, and during two levels of ketamine anaesthesia: with the minimal dose needed to induce behavioural unresponsiveness and twice this dose. We found that PCIST was only slightly reduced from wakefulness to light ketamine anaesthesia, but dropped significantly with deeper anaesthesia. The high-dose effect was selectively associated with reduced high frequency/low frequency ratio in the posteromedial cortex, which strongly correlated with PCIST. Conversely, behavioural unresponsiveness induced by light ketamine anaesthesia was associated with similar spectral changes in frontal, but not posterior cortical regions. Thus, activity in the posteromedial cortex correlates with the capacity for consciousness, as assessed by PCIST, during different depths of ketamine anaesthesia, in rats, independently of behaviour. These results are discussed in relation to different theories of consciousness.
Several theories link consciousness to complex cortical dynamics, as suggested by comparison of brain signal diversity between conscious states and states where consciousness is lost or reduced. In particular, Lempel-Ziv complexity, amplitude coalition entropy and synchrony coalition entropy distinguish wakefulness and REM sleep from deep sleep and anesthesia, and are elevated in psychedelic states, reported to increase the range and vividness of conscious contents. Some studies have even found correlations between complexity measures and facets of self-reported experience. As suggested by integrated information theory and the entropic brain hypothesis, measures of differentiation and signal diversity may therefore be measurable correlates of consciousness and phenomenological richness. Inspired by these ideas, we tested three hypotheses about EEG signal diversity related to sleep and dreaming. First, diversity should decrease with successively deeper stages of non-REM sleep. Second, signal diversity within the same sleep stage should be higher for periods of dreaming vs. non-dreaming. Third, specific aspects of dream contents should correlate with signal diversity in corresponding cortical regions. We employed a repeated awakening paradigm in sleep deprived healthy volunteers, with immediate dream report and rating of dream content along a thought-perceptual axis, from exclusively thought-like to exclusively perceptual. Generalized linear mixed models were used to assess how signal diversity varied with sleep stage, dreaming and thought-perceptual rating. Signal diversity decreased with sleep depth, but was not significantly different between dreaming and non-dreaming, even though there was a significant positive correlation between Lempel-Ziv complexity of EEG recorded over the posterior cortex and thought-perceptual ratings of dream contents.
Background and aims While psychedelic agents are known to have powerful, but largely unexplained, effects on contents of consciousness, there is an increasing interest in the potential clinical usefulness of such drugs for therapy, and legalization is discussed in some countries. Thus, it is relevant to study the effects of psychedelic compounds not only on experience, but also on behavioral performance. Methods Seven healthy participants performed a motor response inhibition task before, during, and after sub-anesthetic doses of intravenously administered ketamine. The infusion rate was individually adjusted to produce noticeable subjective psychedelic effects. Results We observed no statistically significant impact of sub-anesthetic ketamine on reaction times, omission errors, or post error slowing, relative to the preceding drug-free condition. However, we did observe significant correlations between performance impairment and self-reported, subjective altered states of consciousness, specifically experience of “anxiety” and “complex imagery.” Conclusions Considering the limited number of participants and large variation in strength of self-reported experiences, further studies with wider ranges of ketamine doses and behavioral tasks are needed to determine the presence and strength of potential behavioral effects.
Objective How and to what extent electrical brain activity is affected in pharmacologically altered states of consciousness, where it is mainly the phenomenological content rather than the level of consciousness that is altered, is not well understood. An example is the moderately psychedelic state caused by low doses of ketamine. Therefore, we investigated whether and how measures of evoked and spontaneous electroencephalographic (EEG) signal diversity are altered by sub-anaesthetic levels of ketamine compared to normal wakefulness, and how these measures relate to subjective assessments of consciousness. Methods High-density electroencephalography (EEG, 62 channels) was used to record spontaneous brain activity and responses evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in 10 healthy volunteers before and after administration of sub-anaesthetic doses of ketamine in an open-label within-subject design. Evoked signal diversity was assessed using the perturbational complexity index (PCI), calculated from the global EEG responses to local TMS perturbations. Signal diversity of spontaneous EEG, with eyes open and eyes closed, was assessed by Lempel Ziv complexity (LZc), amplitude coalition entropy (ACE), and synchrony coalition entropy (SCE). Results Although no significant difference was found in the index of TMS-evoked complexity (PCI) between the sub-anaesthetic ketamine condition and normal wakefulness, all the three measures of spontaneous EEG signal diversity showed significantly increased values in the sub-anaesthetic ketamine condition. This increase in signal diversity also correlated with subjective assessment of altered states of consciousness. Moreover, spontaneous signal diversity was significantly higher when participants had eyes open compared to eyes closed, both during normal wakefulness and during influence of sub-anaesthetic ketamine doses. Conclusion The results suggest that PCI and spontaneous signal diversity may be complementary and potentially measure different aspects of consciousness. Thus, our results seem compatible with PCI being indicative of the brain’s ability to sustain consciousness, as indicated by previous research, while it is possible that spontaneous EEG signal diversity may be indicative of the complexity of conscious content. The observed sensitivity of the latter measures to visual input seems to support such an interpretation. Thus, sub-anaesthetic ketamine may increase the complexity of both the conscious content (experience) and the brain activity underlying it, while the level, degree, or general capacity of consciousness remains largely unaffected.
Background In the Wada test, one hemisphere is selectively anaesthetised by unilateral intracarotid injection of a fast-acting anaesthetic agent. This gives a unique opportunity to observe the functions and physiological activity of one hemisphere while anaesthetising the other, allowing direct comparisons between brain states and hemispheres that are not possible in any other setting. Aim To test whether potential measures of consciousness would be affected by selective anaesthesia of one hemisphere, and reliably distinguish the states of the anesthetised and non-anesthetised hemispheres. Methods We analysed EEG data from 7 patients undergoing Wada-tests in preparation for neurosurgery and computed several measures reported to correlate with the state of consciousness: power spectral density, functional connectivity, and measures of signal diversity. These measures were compared between conditions (normal rest vs. unilateral anaesthesia) and hemispheres (injected vs. non-injected), and used with a support vector machine to classify the state and site of injection objectively from individual patient's recordings. Results Although brain function, assessed behaviourally, appeared to be substantially altered only on the injected side, we found large bilateral changes in power spectral density for all frequency bands tested, and functional connectivity changed significantly both between and within both hemispheres. Surprisingly, we found no statistically significant differences in the measures of signal diversity between hemispheres or states, for the group of 7 patients, although 4 of the individual patients showed a significant decrease in signal diversity on the injected side. Nevertheless, including signal diversity measures improved the classification results, indicating that these measures carry at least some non-redundant information about the condition and injection site. We propose that several of these results may be explained by conduction of activity, via the corpus callosum, from the injected to the contralateral hemisphere and vice versa, without substantially affecting the function of the receiving hemisphere, thus reflecting what we call “cross-state unreceptiveness”.
Dreams are internally generated experiences that occur independently of current sensory input. Here we argue, based on cortical anatomy and function, that dream experiences are tightly related to the workings of a specific part of cortical pyramidal neurons, the apical integration zone (AIZ). The AIZ receives and processes contextual information from diverse sources and could constitute a major switch point for transitioning from externally to internally generated experiences such as dreams. We propose that during dreams the output of certain pyramidal neurons is mainly driven by input into the AIZ. We call this mode of functioning “apical drive”. Our hypothesis is based on the evidence that the cholinergic and adrenergic arousal systems, which show different dynamics between waking, slow wave sleep, and rapid eye movement sleep, have specific effects on the AIZ. We suggest that apical drive may also contribute to waking experiences, such as mental imagery. Future studies, investigating the different modes of apical function and their regulation during sleep and wakefulness are likely to be richly rewarded.
We test whether a measure based on the directed transfer function (DTF) calculated from short segments of electroencephalography (EEG) time-series can be used to monitor the state of the patients also during sevoflurane anesthesia as it can for patients undergoing propofol anesthesia. We collected and analyzed 25-channel EEG from 7 patients (3 females, ages 41–56 years) undergoing surgical anesthesia with sevoflurane, and quantified the sensor space directed connectivity for every 1-s epoch using DTF. The resulting connectivity parameters were compared to corresponding parameters from our previous study (n = 8, patients anesthetized with propofol and remifentanil, but otherwise using a similar protocol). Statistical comparisons between and within studies were done using permutation statistics, a data driven algorithm based on the DTF-parameters was employed to classify the epochs as coming from awake or anesthetized state. According to results of the permutation tests, DTF-parameter topographies were significantly different between the awake and anesthesia state at the group level. However, the topographies were not significantly different when comparing results computed from sevoflurane and propofol data, neither in the awake nor in anesthetized state. Optimizing the algorithm for simultaneously having high sensitivity and specificity in classification yielded an accuracy of 95.1% (SE = 0.96%), with sensitivity of 98.4% (SE = 0.80%) and specificity of 94.8% (SE = 0.10%). These findings indicate that the DTF changes in a similar manner when humans undergo general anesthesia caused by two distinct anesthetic agents with different molecular mechanisms of action.
Grid cells with their rigid hexagonal firing fields are thought to provide an invariant metric to the hippocampal cognitive map, yet environmental geometrical features have recently been shown to distort the grid structure. Given that the hippocampal role goes beyond space, we tested the influence of nonspatial information on the grid organization. We trained rats to daily learn three new reward locations on a cheeseboard maze while recording from the medial entorhinal cortex and the hippocampal CA1 region. Many grid fields moved toward goal location, leading to long-lasting deformations of the entorhinal map. Therefore, distortions in the grid structure contribute to goal representation during both learning and recall, which demonstrates that grid cells participate in mnemonic coding and do not merely provide a simple metric of space.
Navigation requires the integration of many sensory inputs to form a multi-modal cognitive map of the environment, which is believed to be implemented in the hippocampal region by spatially tuned cells [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. These cells encode various aspects of the environment in a world-based (allocentric) reference frame. Although the cognitive map is represented in allocentric coordinates, the environment is sensed through diverse sensory organs, mostly situated in the animal’s head, and therefore represented in sensory and parietal cortices in head-centered egocentric coordinates. Yet it is not clear how and where the brain transforms these head-centered egocentric representations to map-like allocentric representations computed in the hippocampal region. Theoretical modeling has predicted a role for both egocentric and head direction (HD) information in performing an egocentric-allocentric transformation [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Here, we recorded new data and also used data from a previous study [16]. Adapting a generalized linear model (GLM) classification [17]; we show that the postrhinal cortex (POR) contains a population of pure egocentric boundary cells (EBCs), in contrast with the conjunctive EBCs × HD cells, which we found downstream mostly in the parasubiculum (PaS) and in the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC). Our finding corroborates the idea of a brain network performing an egocentric to allocentric transformation by HD cells. This is a fundamental building block in the formation of the brain’s internal cognitive map.
An agent’s actions can be influenced by external factors through the inputs it receives from the environment, as well as internal factors, such as memories or intrinsic preferences. The extent to which an agent’s actions are “caused from within”, as opposed to being externally driven, should depend on its sensor capacity as well as environmental demands for memory and context-dependent behavior. Here, we test this hypothesis using simulated agents (“animats”), equipped with small adaptive Markov Brains (MB) that evolve to solve a perceptual-categorization task under conditions varied with regards to the agents’ sensor capacity and task difficulty. Using a novel formalism developed to identify and quantify the actual causes of occurrences (“what caused what?”) in complex networks, we evaluate the direct causes of the animats’ actions. In addition, we extend this framework to trace the causal chain (“causes of causes”) leading to an animat’s actions back in time, and compare the obtained spatio-temporal causal history across task conditions. We found that measures quantifying the extent to which an animat’s actions are caused by internal factors (as opposed to being driven by the environment through its sensors) varied consistently with defining aspects of the task conditions they evolved to thrive in.
Integrated information theory (IIT) proposes a measure of integrated information, termed Phi (Φ), to capture the level of consciousness of a physical system in a given state. Unfortunately, calculating Φ itself is currently possible only for very small model systems and far from computable for the kinds of system typically associated with consciousness (brains). Here, we considered several proposed heuristic measures and computational approximations, some of which can be applied to larger systems, and tested if they correlate well with Φ. While these measures and approximations capture intuitions underlying IIT and some have had success in practical applications, it has not been shown that they actually quantify the type of integrated information specified by the latest version of IIT and, thus, whether they can be used to test the theory. In this study, we evaluated these approximations and heuristic measures considering how well they estimated the Φ values of model systems and not on the basis of practical or clinical considerations. To do this, we simulated networks consisting of 3–6 binary linear threshold nodes randomly connected with excitatory and inhibitory connections. For each system, we then constructed the system’s state transition probability matrix (TPM) and generated observed data over time from all possible initial conditions. We then calculated Φ, approximations to Φ, and measures based on state differentiation, coalition entropy, state uniqueness, and integrated information. Our findings suggest that Φ can be approximated closely in small binary systems by using one or more of the readily available approximations (r > 0.95) but without major reductions in computational demands. Furthermore, the maximum value of Φ across states (a state-independent quantity) correlated strongly with measures of signal complexity (LZ, rs = 0.722), decoder-based integrated information (Φ*, rs = 0.816), and state differentiation (D1, rs = 0.827). These measures could allow for the efficient estimation of a system’s capacity for high Φ or function as accurate predictors of low- (but not high-)Φ systems. While it is uncertain whether the results extend to larger systems or systems with other dynamics, we stress the importance that measures aimed at being practical alternatives to Φ be, at a minimum, rigorously tested in an environment where the ground truth can be established.
Positive effects of variable practice conditions on subsequent motor memory consolidation and generalization are widely accepted and described as the contextual interference effect (CIE). However, the general benefits of CIE are low and these benefits might even depend on decreased retest performances in the blocked-practicing control group, caused by retroactive inhibition. The aim of this study was to investigate if CIE represents a true learning phenomenon or possibly reflects confounding effects of retroactive inhibition. We tested 48 healthy human participants adapting their reaching movements to three different force field magnitudes. Subjects practiced the force fields in either a Blocked (B), Random (R), or Constant (C) schedule. In addition, subjects of the Blocked group performed either a retest schedule that did (Blocked-Matched; BM) or did not (Blocked-Unmatched; BU) control for retroactive inhibition. Results showed that retroactive inhibition did not affect the results of the BU group much and that the Random group showed a better consolidation performance compared to both Blocked groups. However, compared to the Constant group, the Random group showed only slight benefits in its memory consolidation of the mean performance across all force field magnitudes and no benefits in absolute performance values. This indicates that CIE reflects a true motor learning phenomenon, which is independent of retroactive inhibition. However, random practice is not always beneficial over constant practice.
Oriens-lacunosum moleculare (OLM) cells are hippocampal inhibitory interneurons that are implicated in the regulation of information flow in the CA1 circuit, inhibiting cortical inputs to distal pyramidal cell dendrites, whilst disinhibiting CA3 inputs to pyramidal cells. OLM cells express metabotropic cholinergic (mAChR) and glutamatergic (mGluR) receptors, so modulation of these cells via these receptors may contribute to switching between functional modes of the hippocampus. Using a transgenic mouse line to identify OLM cells, we found that both mAChR and mGluR activation caused the cells to exhibit long-lasting depolarizing plateau potentials following evoked spike trains. Both mAChR- and mGluR-induced plateau potentials were eliminated by blocking transient receptor potential (TRP) channels, and were dependent on intracellular calcium concentration and calcium entry. Pharmacological tests indicated that Group I mGluRs are responsible for the glutamatergic induction of plateaus. There was also a pronounced synergy between the cholinergic and glutamatergic modulation, plateau potentials being generated by agonists applied together at concentrations too low to elicit any change when applied individually. This synergy could enable OLM cells to function as coincidence detectors of different neuromodulatory systems, leading to their enhanced and prolonged activation and a functional change in information flow within the hippocampus.
It has been argued that general anesthetics suppress the level of consciousness, or the contents of consciousness, or both. The distinction between level and content is important because, in addition to clarifying the mechanisms of anesthesia, it may help clarify the neural bases of consciousness. We assess these arguments in the light of evidence that both the level and the content of consciousness depend upon the contribution of apical input to the information processing capabilities of neocortical pyramidal cells which selectively amplify relevant signals. We summarize research suggesting that what neocortical pyramidal cells transmit information about can be distinguished from levels of arousal controlled by sub-cortical nuclei and from levels of prioritization specified by interactions within the thalamocortical system. Put simply, on the basis of the observations reviewed, we hypothesize that when conscious we have particular, directly experienced, percepts, thoughts, feelings and intentions, and that general anesthetics affect consciousness by interfering with the subcellular processes by which particular activities are selectively amplified when relevant to the current context.
Objective: The objective of this study was to test whether properties of 1-s segments of spontaneous scalp EEG activity can be used to automatically distinguish the awake state from the anesthetized state in patients undergoing general propofol anesthesia. Methods: Twenty five channel EEG was recorded from 10 patients undergoing general intravenous propofol anesthesia with remifentanil during anterior cervical discectomy and fusion. From this, we extracted properties of the EEG by applying the Directed Transfer Function (DTF) directly to every 1-s segment of the raw EEG signal. The extracted properties were used to develop a data-driven classification algorithm to categorize patients as “anesthetized” or “awake” for every 1-s segment of raw EEG. Results: The properties of the EEG signal were significantly different in the awake and anesthetized states for at least 8 of the 25 channels (p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected Wilcoxon rank-sum tests). Using these differences, our algorithms achieved classification accuracies of 95.9%. Conclusion: Properties of the DTF calculated from 1-s segments of raw EEG can be used to reliably classify whether the patients undergoing general anesthesia with propofol and remifentanil were awake or anesthetized. Significance: This method may be useful for developing automatic real-time monitors of anesthesia.
Severe motor impairments can affect the ability to communicate. The ability to see has a decisive influence on the augmentative and alternative communication (AAC) systems available to the user. To better understand the initial impressions users have of AAC systems we asked naïve healthy participants to compare two visual (a visual P300 brain-computer interface (BCI) and an eye-tracker) and two non-visual systems (an auditory and a tactile P300 BCI). Eleven healthy participants performed 20 selections in a five choice task with each system. The visual P300 BCI used face stimuli, the auditory P300 BCI used Japanese Hiragana syllables and the tactile P300 BCI used a stimulator on the small left finger, middle left finger, right thumb, middle right finger and small right finger. The eye-tracker required a dwell time of 3 s on the target for selection. We calculated accuracies and information-transfer rates (ITRs) for each control method using the selection time that yielded the highest ITR and an accuracy above 70% for each system. Accuracies of 88% were achieved with the visual P300 BCI (4.8 s selection time, 20.9 bits/min), of 70% with the auditory BCI (19.9 s, 3.3 bits/min), of 71% with the tactile BCI (18 s, 3.4 bits/min) and of 100% with the eye-tracker (5.1 s, 28.2 bits/min). Performance between eye-tracker and visual BCI correlated strongly, correlation between tactile and auditory BCI performance was lower. Our data showed no advantage for either non-visual system in terms of ITR but a lower correlation of performance which suggests that choosing the system which suits a particular user is of higher importance for non-visual systems than visual systems.
The medial entorhinal cortex (mEC) is strongly involved in spatial navigation, memory, dementia and epilepsy. Although potassium channels shape neuronal activity, their roles in mEC are largely unknown. We used the new Kv2 blocker Guangxitoxin-1E (GTx; 10–100 nm) in rat brain slices to investigate Kv2 channel functions in mEC layer II stellate cells (SCs). These neurons project to the hippocampus and are considered to be grid cells representing space. Voltage clamp recordings from SCs nucleated patches showed that GTx inhibited a delayed rectifier K+ current activating beyond –30 mV but not transient A-type current. In current clamp, GTx (i) had almost no effect on the first action potential but markedly slowed repolarization of late spikes during repetitive firing; (ii) enhanced the after-depolarization (ADP); (iii) reduced fast and medium after-hyperpolarizations (AHPs); (iv) strongly enhanced burst firing and increased excitability at moderate spike rates but reduced spiking at high rates; and (v) reduced spike clustering and rebound potentials. The changes in bursting and excitability were related to the altered ADPs and AHPs. Kv2 channels strongly shape the activity of mEC SCs by affecting spike repolarization, after-potentials, excitability and spike patterns. GTx is a useful tool and may serve to further clarify Kv2 channel functions in neurons. We conclude that Kv2 channels in mEC SCs are important determinants of intrinsic properties that allow these neurons to produce spatial representation. The results of the present study may also be important for the accurate modelling of grid cells. This is the peer reviewed version of the article which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1113/JP273024. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the “mind-body problem”) has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness.
https://www.med.uio.no/imb/forskning/grupper/hjernesignaler/i-media-nyheter/forskningsdagene-2020-hjernen-og-bevissthet.html
https://www.med.uio.no/imb/forskning/grupper/hjernesignaler/i-media-nyheter/forskningsdagene-2020.html